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Abstract
We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of economic environments.
The language is based on a set of well-deﬁned design principles and makes explicit an agent’s
rights, as derivedfrom property, and an agent’s obligations, as derived from restrictions placed on
its actions either voluntarily or as a consequence of other actions. Coupled with the language
is a run-time system that is able to monitor and enforce rights and obligations in an agent-
mediated economic environment. The framework allows an agent to formally express guarantees
(obligations) in relation to its actions, and the run-time system automatically checks that these
obligations are met and veriﬁes that an agent has appropriate rights before executing an action.
Rights and obligations are viewed as ﬁrst-class goods that can be transferred from one agent
to another. This treatment makes it easy to deﬁne natural and expressive recursive statements,
so that, for instance, one may have rights or obligations in selling or trading some other right
or obligation. We deﬁne fundamental axioms about well-functioning markets in terms of rights
and obligations, and delineate the diﬀerence between ownership and possession, arguably two
of the most important notions in economic markets. The framework provides a rich set of
action-related constructs for modeling conditional and non-deterministic eﬀects, and introduces
the use of transactions to safely bundle actions, including the issuing of rights and taking on of
obligations. By way of example, we show that our language can represent a variety of economic
mechanisms, ranging from simple two-agent single-good exchanges to complicated combinatorial
auctions. The framework, which is fully implemented, can be used to formalize the semantics
of markets; as a platform for prototyping, testing and evaluating agent-mediated markets; and
also provide a basis for deploying an electronic market.
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11 Introduction
Many authors have written about a future of agent-mediated electronic commerce, in which agents
engage in commerce on behalf of individuals and businesses [23, 27, 30, 36, 46, 48, 50, 51, 63].
Part of the challenge of agent-mediated commerce is one of providing trust and reliability, so that
agents act, and can be seen to act, in the interests of the parties that they represent, be they
individuals, ﬁrms, or other groups of people. This motivates our formal scripting language for
describing economic markets that is: (i) natural and easy to understand, for humans to be able to
participate, (ii) formal and unambiguous, for artiﬁcial agents to be able to participate, and (iii)
amenable to automatic monitoring.
The need for a formal method to describe markets in a computer-compliant yet human-friendly
way naturally arises in a variety of contexts. Most prevalent is that of online transactions between
agents, including both humans and artiﬁcial bidding agents. Our framework can be used to deploy
an actual market that is open to agents joining and participating in economic transactions. An
equally important context is the need for a platform for testing new agent designs, simulating new
mechanism designs, and evaluating their properties. Our framework can provide an important
tool for designers and prospective market participants alike. Indeed, trading agent competitions
with simulated markets have provided new impetus to the problem of bidding agent design [52,
61]. We enable a well-speciﬁed and functional “sand box” for the development of such market
environments, including also for the monitoring and validation of particular market mechanisms
and agent behaviors.
The scripting language we propose captures the essential semantics, namely rights and obliga-
tions, of economic environments. Rights enable agents to obtain utility by taking actions on goods
that they own or possess, while obligations allow them to engage in safe transactions and make
credible commitments to rules of encounter [28, 46]. We adopt rights and obligations as ﬁrst-class
goods, and derive fundamental market axioms. The axioms delineate the diﬀerence between own-
ership and possession of goods, and allow agents to manipulate goods as a result of derived rights.
Additional axioms provide a natural means to implement private information, a central notion in
economic markets. The provisions of axioms apply recursively on rights and obligations themselves.
These axioms are enforced through a monitoring system that we couple with our formal scripting
language. Given a description of an economic environment, the monitoring system implements the
domain in a prescribed way, thus giving precise semantics to the scripting language.
Agents can interact with the monitoring system and aﬀect, through their actions, the state
of the economic environment. For example, an agent can initiate a new economic mechanism by
specifying obligations on its behavior (e.g., “I will sell to the highest bidder.”) and granting rights
to participants (e.g., “All pre-qualiﬁed bidders can place a bid.”). The ways in which agents may
interact is enhanced through a rich set of action-related constructs that our framework provides,
which account, amongst others, for conditional and non-deterministic eﬀects. We also deﬁne trans-
actions as a means to safely bundle actions together, allowing agents to simultaneously trade goods,
issue rights, and take on obligations.
Unique to our framework is that we take a black-box approach to the speciﬁcation of agents and
impose no restrictions on their design and internal workings. As a result, the monitoring system
does not need to perform complex activities such as planning on behalf of agents, or solving hard
winner-determination problems in auctions. The monitoring system is instead required to verify
whether certain goals are established, by having agents state obligations and then provide suﬃcient
information to the monitoring system to enable their easy veriﬁcation. The task of veriﬁcation
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instance, provide market-clearing prices to allow the master agent to verify that the former has
met its obligation in regard to solving the winner determination problem optimally, but without
requiring the master agent to solve the optimization problem itself. Appropriate punitive sanctions
may be taken by the master agent if the speciﬁed condition is not met, as deﬁned in the obligation.
This is a middle road between a completely formal but hard to program system, and a completely
open-ended but informal system. Obligations, and also rights, provide a well-deﬁned interface
between the monitoring system and the agents that act in the market.
1.1 Design Principles
Our framework is fully implemented, and designed to respect four central principles. The ﬁrst two
principles exemplify the generality of the proposed framework, while the other two ensure soundness
in monitoring and enforcing rights and obligations, and in determining the eﬀects of executing an
action.
Black-box Principle: Agents are entities that exist outside our framework and can be imple-
mented in a diﬀerent language (or be people, interacting through proxy agents). Agents
reason based on their own beliefs and this reasoning is completely decoupled from the frame-
work that monitors the evolution of the economic environment world in which the agents
participate.
Free-will Principle: Agents choose which action to take and cannot be forced to take actions.
Rather than require an agent to take a speciﬁc action, for instance an action that satisﬁes its
obligations, the framework monitors an agent’s obligations and is empowered (via the master
agent) to execute the sanctions associated with an obligation when an agent fails to meet it.
Restriction Principle: The monitoring system is able to track the rights of agents and restrict
the execution of actions for which an agent does not hold appropriate rights.
Soundness Principle: When an action is invoked, and if the appropriate right is held and the ac-
tion’s executability preconditions are met, then the action’s eﬀects are produced in accordance
with the laws of the economic environment.
By the black-box principle, an agent retains its autonomy in terms of the state of its beliefs
and the reasoning mechanism it employs — the framework does not impose any requirements on
the internal workings of an agent, nor does it force an agent to reason in a prescribed way, other
than its ability to interact with the provided interface. By the free-will principle, the agent freely
chooses which actions, among those available, it will take. We note that although related, the
black-box and free-will principles are distinct. It would be possible to design a framework where
either of these two principles would hold, but not the other. The former principle ascertains only
that the internal workings of an agent are unknown, leaving open, however, the possibility that
the agent might be expected to act in a prescribed manner without any free-will. Similarly, the
latter principle ascertains only that the agent is able to freely choose its next action, leaving open,
however, the possibility that the agent’s internal state is visible to the system that monitors the
economic environment (and perhaps to the rest of the agents).
In contrast to the privacy and freedom of choice oﬀered by the ﬁrst two principles, an agent’s
obligations are monitored, and any (presumably punitive) actions are executed upon the world
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request that an action is taken. These requests are screened by the monitoring system and actions
are executed only if an agent has the appropriate rights.
This approach of restricting action executions complements the free-will principle: an agent’s
available actions can be restricted by the monitoring system, but the agent still retains the choice
of which (if any) actions to take. The soundness principle requires that the monitoring system
will always respect the laws of the market, as deﬁned by the designer of a domain. The practical
implication of this principle is that the monitoring system acts as a trusted party; its actions can
be independently veriﬁed, since the monitoring system’s speciﬁcation and implementation is open
for inspection by all involved parties.
We illustrate our design principles by analogy to the ebay.com marketplace. eBay participants
freely choose when to enter or leave eBay’s economic environment. Once a participant has joined
the market (and has a valid user ID), then she can interact with the market via the WWW interface.
For instance, as a seller this occurs by initializing a new auction and providing information about
the good for sale. This will typically obligate the seller to enter into a contract to sell the good to
the agent associated with the highest bid received by the auction deadline. A buyer interacts with
the eBay market through an eBay proxy agent, to which a buyer reports a (maximum) willingness-
to-pay for the good. A valid “bid” action of this form is one that is higher than the bid price posted
for the current winner. Thus, the right to take such an action depends on the current state of the
auction. Following a valid bid, the proxy will compete with other bidders within the auction either
until the participant is winning or until her maximal willingness-to-pay is reached. The participants
then observe the new state, and while the auction remains open participants can continue to revise
their bids upwards.
The black-box principle applies to eBay. Participants on eBay (“agents” elsewhere in this
paper) are independent of the eBay marketplace and autonomous. The only requirement placed on
a participant is that she can interact with eBay’s market through the interface, e.g., via web page
links and forms. The eBay market is also consistent with the free-will principle. eBay does not
(and cannot) force a participant to honor a transaction. Rather, eBay encourages others to punish
a participant that fails to meet an obligation by providing the other party in the transaction
with the right to leave negative feedback in the recommendation system.1 We can also see the
restriction principle: eBay participants can auction items, or bid on items, but only when they
have appropriate rights. As noted above, a participant only has the right to submit a new bid to
the proxy if the new bid is high enough. Lastly, the soundness principle applies, for instance, in
that a paying agent is guaranteed that if the paying action is invoked via an electronic cash system
such as paypal.com, and the action’s execution preconditions are met, then the appropriate eﬀects
will be produced, irrespective of what other events (e.g., the concurrent execution of some other
payment, or the closing of some auction one hour ago) take place.2
1From http://pages.ebay.com/help/confidence/programs-investigations.html: “eBay cannot force a seller
to honor their transactions. You should leave appropriate feedback for the reluctant seller [...]”.
2If there are insuﬃcient funds in the payer’s bank account, then the action execution will not transfer funds to
the payee. The fact that the goal of executing the action was not met is orthogonal to the soundness principle, which
states that the eﬀects of the action, whatever those may be depending on the state of the world, will be produced.
41.2 Applications
We envision three main applications of our framework for specifying and monitoring economic
environments using rights and obligations:
• The scripting language can be used by itself, either as a means for describing economic
environments (and their rules) in an agreed upon formal syntax, or as a speciﬁcation language
for contracts amongst individuals, agents, or businesses. The language’s semantics guarantees
that the descriptions are unambiguous, while the natural syntax and semantics allow human
participants to understand and reason about the described markets. Arbitration in the case
of disagreement on the provisions of a contract can be done through the monitoring system,
which can provide objective facts about some disputed issues.
• The framework can be used to provide a platform for prototyping, testing and evaluating
newly developed automated agents and market protocols. A market protocol can be described
in the scripting language, and the monitoring system can then be used to run a simulation
of the market. Agents can participate in the economic environment, interacting according
to their speciﬁcations. The entire history of the market is recorded, allowing for subsequent
analysis of the performance of the market and agent designs. This evaluation process can
support the testing of automated agents and the testing of market protocols before they are
deployed, and hence allows a designer to anticipate or prevent possible shortcomings of the
developed designs.
• The framework provides the basis for deploying an electronic market. The monitoring system
can be used as the underlying engine that keeps track of the market evolution, and can
ensure that the market laws, as described in the scripting language, are adhered to by all the
participants; e.g., with rights veriﬁed and with punishments associated with unmet obligations
executed. This engine can reside on a server with appropriate web-based interfaces to allow
human users and automated agents to interact with the market; e.g., with both web browser
and API interfaces. The history recording feature can be used to verify that the correct
transactions took place in the electronic market.
Using the framework for the deployment of electronic markets seems to carry with it some
inherent diﬃculties because participants do not act only within the purview of the electronic market,
but can freely interact — and also be required to act — in other ways. One question that naturally
arises is how are goods and money “transferred” between participants in the physical world? For
example, suppose that a car is sold in the electronic market, for the amount of US $5000. How
can one ensure that the car will also be sold in the physical world and that the buyer will pay the
seller?
The described problem is not speciﬁc to our framework, but rather a general problem faced by
any electronic market. One response is to couple the electronic market directly with transaction
execution in the physical world. For instance, the amazon.com electronic marketplace enables this
by providing third-party logistics, e.g., with sellers able to store goods in Amazon’s warehouses and
entering into a contract with Amazon to ship goods upon the completion of a sale in the electronic
marketplace. Another approach is to build the rules of the electronic market on top of laws in the
physical world. The ebay.com marketplace provides an example of this approach, with all actions
in the electronic market treated as binding contracts under national legal jurisdiction. Thus, by
agreeing to sell her car on eBay, a seller also enters into a real world contract, enforceable by the
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adopted for the virtual economy should be rich enough to serve this dual role so that the virtual
world “bootstraps” onto the real world. The formal semantics of our framework, and the history
of all actions and states, play an essential role here, in providing an unambiguous language for
contracts and a record of actions invoked by participants.
1.3 Related Work
The important role that property rights play in well-deﬁned economic environments is well un-
derstood and much discussed in the foundational economic literature on market institutions and
organization theory. For instance, Tirole [55] writes,
“A decision right or authority granted to a party is the right for the party to pick a
decision in an allowed set of decisions. A property right on an asset, i.e., its ownership,
is a bundle of decision rights.”
As discussed by Hart [26], it is standard to model a ﬁrm as a collection of assets, and consider
the ability of a ﬁrm to retain a speciﬁc subset of its bundle of rights while selling all other residual
rights [26]. We provide this kind of expressiveness in our formal semantics. Moreover, the role of
obligations and commitment is recognized to be important for writing eﬃcient contracts [26], and
also in the design of economic mechanisms such as auctions, where obligations provide constraints
that enable an agent to commit to the use of a particular rule in determining the outcome of a
negotiation process [28].
The theory of deontic logic and normative systems, as described by McCarty [37] and in the
edited collection of Meyer and Wieringa [38], provides the logic of rights and obligations, and is
concerned with performing inference about what should happen in a system while still allowing for
the possibility of non-normative behavior, for example seeking to establish the validity of statements
such as “Is every obligatory action permitted?”; see also Carmo and Jones [10]. For a survey of
applications of deontic logic within computer science, see Wieringa and Meyer [62]. We adopt
soft obligations, with sanctions imposed on agents in case of failure to meet their obligations. The
alternative approach of adopting hard obligations is inconsistent with our free-will principle that we
adopt here; agents in our environments may well take actions that lead them to states in which their
obligations are violated, for instance when striking a tradeoﬀ between local goals and sanctions.
By adopting soft obligations we also avoid certain well-known paradoxes discussed in the deontic
logic literature. Such paradoxes occur, for instance, in the presence of “contrary-to-duty” obliga-
tions [38, 68], that is, secondary obligations whose provisions hold in case a primary obligation is
violated. If it is known that the primary obligation is violated, then one is lead to deduce that the
provisions of both primary and secondary obligations apply, even if these provisions are incompat-
ible; this results in an inconsistent state of aﬀairs when the employed obligations are hard (in our
sense). On the other hand, if the employed obligations are soft, then no inconsistency is reached per
se. Instead, one is lead to deduce that an agent is expected (but not forced) to reach a state where
both obligations are satisﬁed. As initially assumed, the primary obligation is necessarily violated,
but this does not preclude (through an inconsistency) the agent from pursuing the satisfaction of
its “contrary-to-duty” obligations; the intuitive interpretation of such domains is thus preserved.
Prior work in multi-agent systems has considered the role of rights and obligations for the
speciﬁcation and semantics of open systems through electronic institutions [4, 15, 16, 44, 53, 64].
Such systems allow agents to enter and perform tasks, while providing an explicit speciﬁcation of
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note,
“[...] theintr o duction ofnorms thathelptoc op ewiththeheter o geneity,theautonomy
and the diversity of interests among autonomous agents has been considered as a key
issue towards the computational representation of open societies of agents.”
This prior work diﬀers in terms of whether obligations place hard or soft constraints on agents.
Along with hard constraints comes the need for the total control, or regimentation, of agents [8, 22,
25], together with methods to verify compliant agent protocols [2] and validate planned actions [67].
Soft constraints, on the other hand, allow agents to autonomously decide whether to comply and
how to act [4, 16]. Recent work generally adopts our philosophy that autonomy will typically
preclude hard constraints, due to private agent states and goals and also agent autonomy in taking
actions [1, 35]; indeed, Fornara and Colombetti [20] note that regimentation is often impossible
and sometimes detrimental.
Approaches diﬀer in whether the monitoring system actively enforces sanctions, perhaps through
controllable agents, as in our work and many others [1, 4, 6, 9, 16, 19, 21, 35, 57], or only passively
maintains the global state and informs agents of their obligations and the failed obligations of
other agents (with an appeal to “social control”) [15, 56]; see Castelfranchi et al. [11] for an earlier
discussion. L´ opez y Lopez et al. [35] also adopt the idea of “promoters” that can provide positive
rewards as a complement to the negative consequences of sanctions. Obligations in our framework
can trivially be used to implement promoters.3
A feature that we share with most of the literature is that we provide, through rights, or the
absence thereof, for prohibition and permission on (complex) actions; see for instance Wyner [66].
On the other hand, the conditions in our obligations are state-based (cf. [15]) rather than action-
based (cf. [4, 8]); see d’Altan et al. [14] and Wyner [66] for a further discussion of deontic action
logics in which obligations are associated with actions and comparisons between this “ought-to-do”
approach and our “ought-to-be” approach. Our language does in fact permit simple action-based
obligations, when the invocation and the successful (or not) execution of actions can be encoded in
states. For instance, an auctioneer may be obliged to take a “sell” action and by so doing move the
world into a state in which an item is sold to the highest bidder. We generally agree, however, with
L´ opez y Lopez et al. [35], who observe that normative goals — equivalent to associating obligations
with states — are more compatible with autonomous agents who can choose to satisfy goals instead
of being told how to do it.... An extreme, opposing approach seems to be provided by Deontic
interpreted systems [34], in which agent logic is directly validated by, and visible to, the electronic
institution.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work to adopt rights and obligations as ﬁrst-class
goods that agents can explicitly trade and exchange. The ability to sell bundles of rights, and limit
them with obligations, seems crucial to the functioning of markets as deﬁned by authors such as
Tirole [55] and Hart [26]. In our framework, transactions enable the safe bundling of rights and
obligations to make such exchanges possible. Our approach is signiﬁcantly more general in this
regard than earlier work [15, 53], in which it is simply observed that agents might contract with
3Our obligations have three arguments. When interpreted as (satisfy, violate, action) then this is an obligation,
and the action is expected to be punitive. In order to encode promoters, one need only treat “violate” as the goal,
“satisfy” as the expiration of the oﬀer, and “action” as the reward. That is, promoters are simply obligations that
an agent is actively trying to “violate”, so as to cause the invocation of the action, which is expected to be beneﬁcial.
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al. [65] provide a formal taxonomy for the rules of electronic auctions, they provide a semantics for
high-level auction attributes rather than building up market protocols from underlying principles
related to rights and obligations.
Similarly, we are unaware of any prior work that explicitly sets out to model the rights that
derive from goods in economic worlds,o rt h es e m a n t i c so fownership and possession. Indeed,
while many authors consider the design of open agent societies, and formal semantics for electronic
institutions and organizations [3, 13, 18, 19, 24, 42, 59], the emphasis seems diﬀerent from our work.
To illustrate some diﬀerences, we can consider the work of Arcos et al. [3], which introduces an
electronic institutions development environment (EIDE). (Notably, the methods of Arcos et al. [3]
have been applied to the deployment of an electronic market for ﬁsh trading [13].) We share some
features with EIDE [3], such as ignoring the internal details of how agents make decisions, and the
use of a monitoring system and special “mediating” agents (their Institution Manager, our master
agent). On the other hand, Arcos et al. (and similarly [24, 42, 59]) seek to model institutions
such as market protocols at a much greater level of detail than in our work. It is typical to adopt
process algebraic approaches and concurrency theory to model the detailed workﬂow of protocols.
In return for this, the veriﬁcation of some aspects of correctness (such as the reachability of states,
liveness, etc.) is possible. By adopting rights and obligations as the language by which commitments
are made between designers, agents and our monitoring system, we allow for a more lightweight,
ﬂexible, and open approach.
Compared with the work of Vazquez et al. [59] on an Organizational Model for Normative
Institutions (OMNI), our approach is not concerned with societal structure and does not consider
agent roles or hierarchies. Neither are we concerned with the meta-problem of how agents can
negotiate new social norms, or the stability of social norms [7, 54]. Finally, our notions of conditional
and limited rights are shared with previous work on formal speciﬁcation languages for ﬁnancial
contracts, namely that of Peyton Jones and Eber [29], although that work focuses on the formal
description and analysis of new forms of ﬁnancial contracts and not on providing frameworks for
the description, simulation, and construction of open agent societies. Similarly, while the π-calculus
has been used for the speciﬁcation of a complex model of a Spanish ﬁsh market by Padget and
Bradford [43] (see also Rodriguez-Aguilar et al. [45]), the goal in that work was to assist with
the development, design and analysis of complex institutions, rather than monitor and enforce
properties of dynamic state.
1.4 Paper Outline
Section 2 provides an overview of the scripting language and monitoring system, and introduces the
semantics of our model. In Section 3 we introduce and discuss the role of rights and obligations.
Section 4 deﬁnes and justiﬁes the fundamental axioms provided in our framework and relates them
to the standard notions of ownership and possession. Section 5 provides some implementation
details. A number of detailed examples are used in Section 6 to illustrate the way in which rights
and obligations can be used in application to various market mechanisms. We conclude in Section 7.
82 Architecture and Model Semantics
Our framework consists of a scripting language and a monitoring system. The scripting language
provides the necessary syntax for describing economic environments and the monitoring system
provides the language semantics. This is analogous to the case of programming languages that are
accompanied by operational semantics; a programmer uses the language to write a program, while
the semantics of the program is deﬁned through the program’s execution in a prescribed manner.
Our programmer is the domain designer, and the program is the domain description, a collection
of laws governing the particular economic environment being modeled. The agents themselves are
also programmed by some programmer, but this is performed outside of our framework.
Before we delve into the details of our framework, we ﬁnd it useful to discuss some issues
pertaining to the guarantees our framework can provide with respect to its semantics. As in most
programming languages, it is not possible to guarantee that any domain description will yield any
reasonable behavior. In particular, we cannot a priori guarantee that an economic environment
being modeled will respect any liveness or safety properties, that deadlocks will be avoided and
progress will bemade, or that some unwanted or unintuitive behavior will not occur. All these events
are possible, and are determined only by the domain description that is fed into the monitoring
system. In fact, it is impossible to even provide conditions under which a domain description
would avoid such unreasonable behavior, since that would constitute a solution to the Halting
Problem, which could be encoded in a domain description (since the proposed scripting language
essentially extents Prolog, a Turing-complete programming language). The burden of ensuring that
an economic environment proceeds as expected lies entirely on the domain designer.
2.1 The Scripting Language
The scripting language is built on top of Prolog, and enjoys its powerful semantics and rich syntax.
Thus, natural constructs appropriate for describing markets, such as lists of objects, predicates
deﬁning attributes of objects, and general schemas that unify with speciﬁc instances, are all present
in the scripting language. Furthermore, the language is easily extensible, allowing the introduction
of new constructs through the addition of Prolog code within domain descriptions. The monitoring
system is also implemented in Prolog, which provides a clean way to interpret domain descriptions
and run the corresponding economic environment.
The domain designer can import libraries describing economic market laws that are common-
place in a variety of settings. This is analogous to ordinary programs, which can typically import
libraries that provide speciﬁc functionality. We have written a number of such libraries, including:
a library on “exchanges of goods” with laws on how goods can be traded, given, or sold between
agents; a library on “handling rights and obligations” with laws on how rights can be given up,
issued, or revoked, and laws on how obligations can be taken on, imposed, or cleared.
2.2 The Monitoring System
The architecture of the monitoring system, and its interface with the agents, is shown in Figure 1.
The monitoring system runs a virtual economic environment, as governed by the laws speciﬁed in
the domain description provided by the domain designer. The laws deﬁne the initial state (e.g., an
allocation of goods), the objects that populate it, and the relevant attributes of these objects. The
laws also dictate how agents might join or leave the market (e.g., by specifying that each agent is
9Figure 1: The modules of the monitoring system.
granted a certain amount of money when entering the market), and the available actions through
which the agents might aﬀect and observe the market’s status.
The agents are not simulated as part of the virtual world and all local deliberation remains
private to an agent. Rather, an agent makes decisions independently and acts through communi-
cation with the monitoring system. The monitoring system executes actions only if an agent has
the appropriate rights. Success or failure of actions is recorded, and the state of the environment
is updated accordingly. Periodically, the monitoring system checks whether an obligation has been
satisﬁed or violated, recording the event and exercising the appropriate punitive sanction in the
case of a state that indicates a violation.
Note that even if a particular set of agents is ﬁxed, a given economic environment may still yield
multiple possible sequences of states, each sequence describing an evolution of the virtual world.
The sequence among all possible ones that will actually occur depends on the outcome of stochastic
events within the environment and also local to each agent. Each such sequence is called a scenario
and corresponds to a speciﬁc instantiation of an economic market. Although the possible scenarios
are dictated by the domain description, the actual scenario that occurs is ultimately deﬁned by the
interaction between the environment and the agents.
The monitoring system is initialized by the administrator of the system, who is responsible
for setting up its diﬀerent modules. Each module is an independent process, which can reside on
its own machine and communicate with the rest of the processes in a server-client manner. The
administrator4 selects the domain description to be loaded and sets up the market’s initial state
through the master agent, a special trusted agent deﬁned within our framework. From that point
onwards the monitoring system awaits for agents to join the market and request the execution of
actions.
The communication module provides the channel through which agents can invoke actions. The
simulation module is responsible for handling the execution of the invoked actions, updating the
state of the market, and reporting new state information to agents. The administrator can also
intervene and instruct the master agent to execute speciﬁc actions. Our framework also allows the
use of proxy agents that can be used by human users who wish to interact with the market. The
4The system administrator is responsible for the execution of a particular market, and need not be the same
person as the domain designer for that particular market. Indeed, we think of domain designers as people who may
write domain descriptions, perhaps for a fee, independently of how these domain descriptions end up being used.
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In addition to allowing for intervention by the administrator, the master agent is used to capture
exogenous events that are outside the agents’ control. For instance, the initial state of the system
is populated by means of the master agent executing the initialize action once the domain de-
scription is loaded. The domain designer can specify the eﬀects of the master agent’s interventions,
for instance in situations such as the arrival or departure of an agent, the passing of time, and the
execution of actions by agents. The master agent is restricted by the designer to execute only a
certain ﬁxed set of actions, and on a well-deﬁned and pre-speciﬁed set of occasions. The existence
of a master agent within our framework is consistent with the role of central, impartial, and trusted
authorities in human markets, for example as provided through the laws and courts of a country.
Similar to the role of a court in punishing violators, the master agent is responsible for executing
the punitive sanctions associated with obligations if violations occur.
2.3 Model Semantics
In this section, we describe the semantics of the dynamic model of our monitoring system. The
world goes through a sequence of states, with each state specifying values for the attributes of the
objects that populate the state. We discuss what these objects look like, how their attributes can
be modiﬁed, and how they deﬁne the state of the market.
2.3.1 Objects and Classes
Each domain deﬁnes a set of classes (as in object oriented programming), each associated with a
set of attributes. Objects are instances of classes.
Deﬁnition 1 (Classes) Let
classes([#class, ...])
denote the set of classes in a domain description. Each class #class is of the form
(#name, [#attribute, ...]),
where #name is the class name, and #attribute is the name of one of the class attributes.
For example, the following code snippet deﬁnes that the classes of the domain description
contain the class for apples, and speciﬁes that instances of this class (i.e., actual apples) have
attributes deﬁning their owner, their possessor, and their weight:
classes([..., (apple, [owned by, held by, weight]), ...]).
A set of basic classes is deﬁned in our framework. The domain designer can also extend this
set depending on the market being modeled.
An object deﬁnes a list of attribute-value pairs. One of these pairs corresponds to the attribute
instance of, and the associated value is the name of the class of which the object is an instance.
The rest of the pairs correspond to the attributes of the object’s class and the values associated
with these attributes. In addition to this list, every object also deﬁnes a unique name, which is
used by the agents and the monitoring system to reference that object.
Deﬁnition 2 (Objects) Let
11(#name, [(instance of, #class), (#attribute, #value), ...])
denote an object, where #name is the object name, #class is the class of which the object is an
instance, #attribute is an attribute of the class #class,a n d#value is the value that object
#name associates with attribute #attribute. All attributes of the class #class should appear in
the deﬁnition of the object #name.
Thus, an apple object is a structure of the following form:
(#name, [(instance of, apple), (owned by, #owner), (held by, #possessor), (weight,
#weight)]).
Note that the notions of ownership and possession are readily supported as attributes of objects.
Transferring ownership or possession of an item from some agent to another reduces to simply
changing the values of the item’s attributes owned by and held by.
In a similar fashion, we deﬁne a class for accounts. One of the attributes of this class is the
balance attribute. Each account object deﬁnes a value for this attribute, which corresponds to
the amount of money the owner of the account has in the account. Transferring money through
payments is implemented by changing this balance in an appropriate way. A similar treatment can
be employed by a domain designer for deﬁning “containers” for objects, when only the quantity and
not the explicit representation of certain objects is important, providing, thus, a level of abstraction.
When trading stock shares, for instance, an agent may be given a portfolio object that keeps track
of the number of the held shares, without needing to identify each share as an individual object.
A special class deﬁned in our framework is the event class.
classes([..., (event, [#description, #happened at, #expired at]), ...]).
As the name suggests, objects that are instances of this class serve to record the various events
that take place in the virtual market. Such events include the initialization of the market, the
arrival or departure of agents, the actions invoked by agents (including sanctions invoked by the
master agent), and the instantiation of new states as a result of preceding events, or of the passing
of time.
The use of objects and classes provides a uniform treatment for both physical goods, like apples,
and abstract goods, like rights and obligations.
2.3.2 States
The state of a market represents all information that exists in the environment of the agents. This
includes the set of objects along with values for their attributes, as well as the set of agents that
populate the market:
Deﬁnition 3 (States) Let
state(#agents, #objects)
denote a state, where #agents is a list of agent names, and #objects is a list of objects.
States are constructs that are manipulated by the monitoring system, and are not explicitly
represented in a domain description. Note that the state of a market does not include information
about the internal states of any of the participating agents; following the black-box principle this
12information is not available to anyone but the agents themselves, which operate outside the moni-
toring system and only communicate with it. Nonetheless, the presence of an agent in the market,
and the ownership or possession of goods, rights, or obligations by an agent is information that is
available to the monitoring system. Whether this information is also viewable by other agents is
an orthogonal issue that we discuss later.
2.3.3 Actions
The existence of objects in the state of a market, and the values of the attributes of objects, are only
aﬀected by means of actions invoked by the agents through their interaction with the monitoring
system. The master agent, controlled by the monitoring system, is also able to invoke actions.
In their primitive form, actions have preconditions and eﬀects:
Deﬁnition 4 (Primitive Actions) Let
action(#agent, #action) :- preconditions(#preconditions), effects(#effects)
denote a primitive action #action, with a list of preconditions #preconditions,a n dal i s to f
eﬀects #effects.
When the monitoring system attempts to execute an action #action, following its invocation
by an agent #agent, it ﬁrst checks whether the agent holds an appropriate right, and whether
the preconditions #preconditions of the action are satisﬁed, and subsequently updates the state
according to the action’s eﬀects #effects.
An action’s preconditions, which can depend on the agent #agent that invokes the action,
are those conditions that need to be met for the action to be “physically” executable. For ex-
ample, an action transferring funds from some account is conditioned on the account containing
the corresponding amount. An action opening an auction on some item is conditioned on the
existence of that item. Action preconditions may contain any Prolog predicate, whose satisﬁa-
bility will be veriﬁed before the action is executed. Among the available predicates is the special
value(#object, [(#attribute,#value),...]) predicate oﬀered by our framework, which is sat-
isﬁed exactly when object #object assigns the value #value to the attribute #attribute, for every
(#attribute,#value) pair in the list.
The possession of an appropriate right to execute an action is treated as an implicit precondition
of every action. The monitoring system takes care of this without the need for the domain designer
to explicitly add such a precondition. We emphasize that a critical diﬀerence between the explicit
preconditions of an action and the implicit precondition of holding an appropriate right, is that the
latter can be traded as a result of the treatment of rights as goods.
An interesting question arises, following the fact that rights can themselves be conditional.
With a conditional right, then both the right’s preconditions and the action’s preconditions must
be met for the action to be successfully executed. How should the domain designer choose whether
any particular condition is to appear in the action’s preconditions or the right’s preconditions? A
rule of thumb that we suggest is to ask whether the precondition is a “physical ability” or a “legal
allowance” precondition; the former are preconditions of the action, while the latter are conditions
of the right.
Intuitively, when conditions are placed on an action it is because whenever such conditions are
not satisﬁed, the action can not be executed under any circumstances. The action of giving an item
13has the precondition of holding that item; if this condition is not true, it is “physically” impossible
for the action to be executed. On the other hand, conditions on a right leave open the possibility
that someone with a less constrained right could in fact execute the action. For instance, the right
to execute the action of selling an item is usually conditioned on owning the item. Yet, one can
easily imagine situations where an attorney, for instance, is granted (by the item’s owner) the less
constrained right to sell the item without the attorney owning it. Thus, the condition of owning
an item is a “legal allowance” and should not appear in the action’s preconditions.
This distinction between physical preconditions and rights is somewhat less clear when one
models electronic markets, since certain actions lose their physical aspect. As an example, imagine
the precondition of placing a bid in an English auction that states that the bid should be higher
than the current highest bid. Is this a precondition of the action of placing a bid, or a condition
on the right to execute the action? In most cases the answer to such questions is inconsequential.
It is up to the domain designer to provide a proper answer when the choice is important.
2.3.4 Eﬀects
Each primitive action is deﬁned to have a set of eﬀects that it produces when the action is success-
fully executed, and which can depend on the agent #agent that invokes the action. The eﬀects are
produced sequentially, and in particular, preceding eﬀects can change the state in which subsequent
eﬀects are executed. Our framework oﬀers a set of eﬀects that provide enough expressiveness in a
variety of situations:
Deﬁnition 5 (Eﬀects) Let
create(#object,#class), destroy(#object),a n dset(#object,#attribute,#value)
denote respectively the action eﬀects that create object #object as an instance of class #class,
destroy object #object, and set the attribute #attribute of object #object to the value #value.
These three basic eﬀects (create, destroy and set) are augmented by appending a condition
to an eﬀect, with
#effect where #condition,
where condition #condition can be any Prolog predicate. The intended semantics of a conditional
eﬀect is then that the condition is checked under Prolog semantics, and for every distinct way the
condition is satisﬁed (i.e., every instantiation of the Prolog variables that #condition contains),
the eﬀect #effect is produced. Since the eﬀect may share Prolog variables with the condition, this
simple construct allows one to obtain many diﬀerent and interesting eﬀects.
In the simplest case the structure allows for simple conditional eﬀects, by having conditions
that are satisﬁed at most once and do not share free Prolog variables with the eﬀect. The following
code snippet corresponds to deﬁning the eﬀect of the turn key(car) action that results in the car
engine running if the fuel tank is full:
set(car, engine, running) where value(car, [(fuel, full)]).
This example also illustrates the most typical use of conditional eﬀects, where conditions test
whether certain objects have certain values for their attributes. Things become more interesting
when the condition and the eﬀect share some free Prolog variables. In that case, we get a diﬀerent
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non-deterministic behavior from an action, since the eﬀects it produces might diﬀer according to
the state. For example, one can represent the eﬀect that one’s account balance increases by the
amount written on the deposited check as follows:
set(account, balance, Balance+Amount) where
(value(account, [balance, Balance]), value(check, [(amount, Amount)])).
Recall that the condition is any Prolog predicate. In particular, the Prolog predicate (#predicate,
..., #predicate) is satisﬁed exactly when all listed predicates are satisﬁed.
Allowing the conditions to be satisﬁed more than once leads to quantiﬁable eﬀects; one can,
for example, deﬁne an eﬀect that gives another agent all the possessions of the agent executing the
action, by having the eﬀect be repeatedly produced, once for each grounding of the condition:
set(Object, held by, alice) where value(Object, [held by, bob]).
Finally, one can even introduce probabilistic eﬀects, by having the condition contain a random
process. To this eﬀect, our framework oﬀers the choose(#choice, #distribution) predicate,
that when checked as part of some condition compares/assigns #choice to a probabilistically cho-
sen value. The possible values and their associated probabilities are deﬁned by the list of pairs
#distribution. Thus, for example, the following code snippet corresponds to deﬁning the eﬀect
of the flip(coin) action that probabilistically produces either heads or tails:
set(coin, side up, Side) where choose(Side, [(0.5, heads), (0.5, tails)]).
As per the speciﬁcation of the choose(#choice, #distribution)predicate, Prolog will ground
Side to heads with probability 0.5a n dt otails with probability 0.5.
Fixing #choice to a speciﬁc value results in the predicate being satisﬁed probabilistically. The
following code snippet corresponds to deﬁning the eﬀect of the drop(plate) action that with high
probability results in the plate being broken (otherwise it remains in its current status):
set(plate, status, broken) where choose(true, [(0.95, true), (0.05, false)]).
Prolog attempts to unify true with true with probability 0.95, in which case the uniﬁcation
succeeds, and the eﬀect of the plate becoming broken is produced. With probability 0.05, Prolog
attempts to unify true with false, which fails, and thus no eﬀect is produced; the status of the
plate remains unchanged.
2.3.5 Transactions
In their transactional rather than primitive form, actions are ordered sequences of actions (which
may be primitive, or transactions themselves).
Deﬁnition 6 (Transactions) Let
action(#agent, #transaction) :- transaction(#actions)
denote the transaction #transaction comprised of the list of actions #actions.
15When executing a transaction either all or none of the constituent actions are successful. The
execution model employed by the monitoring system is to execute each of the actions in turn,
updating the world state after each action. If any of the actions fails to meet its preconditions, or
the agent fails to have an appropriate right at the time of each constituent action’s execution, the
entire execution is rolled back to its original state.
We take the approach that a transaction invoked by an agent will be executed if the agent
either has the right to execute the transaction as a whole, or it has the right to execute each of the
transaction’s constituent actions independently. In the second case, the right for each particular
action should be held at the time that the action is considered, once all of its preceding actions
have been executed. It is possible, then, that the ﬁrst action may grant or revoke an agent’s right
to execute a subsequent action in the transaction, making transactions a very expressive modeling
device.
The notion of transactions is a powerful one, with a number of applications, such as that of
implementing safe exchanges of goods. The transaction:
action(bob, sell(apple,1,alice)) :-
transaction([give(apple,alice), take money(1,alice)]),
for instance, speciﬁes a fail-safe way for Bob to sell his apple to Alice for US $1, without ei-
ther party being vulnerable to the other’s reneging. Assuming Bob has the right to execute the
transaction, the monitoring system will allow Bob to execute the actions give(apple,alice) and
take money(1,alice) which constitute the transaction. Nonetheless, the right to execute the
transaction does not imply that Bob has the right to execute the constituent actions independently
of each other, and out of the context of the sell(apple,1,alice) transaction.
Transactions can also be used in other ways. For example, a domain designer might use trans-
actions simply as a way of providing synonyms or slight variations of actions, by having only a
single action in the transaction, and possibly ﬁxing some of its parameters. Thus, the following
transaction can be used to deﬁne the donate action that sells an item for the token price of 1 cent:
action(Agent, donate(Item,Receiver)) :- transaction([sell(Item,0.01,Receiver)]).
To make things even more interesting, actions within a transaction are allowed to be conditioned
in a way similar to that of conditional eﬀects. It is then straightforward to deﬁne the pay and tip
action that can be used to pay a restaurant bill with a 20 percent tip:
action(Agent, pay and tip(Amount,Receiver)) :-
transaction([pay(AmountWithTip,Receiver) where AmountWithTip = Amount * 1.20]).
Using the same construct, a transaction can be very easily deﬁned that states that all actions
with a certain property (or within a certain set) should be executed. The following transaction
deﬁnes the action sell all that sells all items within a list, each for US $2. The condition of the
sell action used within the transaction uses the Prolog predicate member to traverse all elements
of the list Items; recall that as in the case of conditional eﬀects, the conditional action is executed
once for each grounding of the condition.
action(Agent, sell all(Items,Receiver)) :-
transaction([sell(Item,2,Receiver) where member(Item,Items)]).
16Another interesting use of conditional actions is that it allows the domain designer to deﬁne
transactions that correspond to contingency plans, where actions are executed depending on the
conditions that hold in the given state of the market. The following action, for instance, lets an
agent sell an apple and an orange that the agent may or may not hold.
action(Agent, sell fruits(Receiver)) :- transaction([
sell(apple,1,Receiver) where value(apple, [held by, Agent]),
sell(orange,1,Receiver) where value(orange, [held by, Agent])]).
We emphasize that even if only the orange is held by the agent, the transaction will not fail,
since the constituent action of selling the apple is conditional on the agent holding it; if the agent
does not hold the apple the conditional action is trivially satisﬁed, and the second constituent
action of the transaction will be executed.
Transactions can also be used to bundle the issuing of rights and the taking on of obligations.
Examples of this will be seen in the context of various auction mechanisms in Section 6.
2.3.6 Built-In Actions
The framework provides a set of built-in actions and transactions. Two such actions are those for
creating objects and setting their attributes to speciﬁc values. These actions are available to the
master agent to instantiate objects in the domain. Another action available to the master agent
is that by which an agent loses all of its rights, or is banned from the market. Additional built-in
actions, available when an agent has the appropriate right, include:
• giving ownership and/or possession of goods to other agents, or giving up ownership and/or
possession of goods;
• taking ownership and/or possession of goods from other agents, or taking on obligations;
• issuing ownership and/or possession of rights to other agents;
• giving money to, or taking money from, other agents;
• exercising an expiring right, by executing the intended action and then giving up the right.
Of course, these built-in actions are not meant to be the only actions that are available to
agents. In addition to the built-in actions, the domain designer can deﬁne actions speciﬁc to the
domain being modeled, like, for instance, the fill tank(#car) action whose eﬀect is that of setting
the fuel attribute of the #car object to full.
2.3.7 The Query Action
Important in every economic market is the notion of private information.C o n s i d e r ,f o r e x a m p l e :
a sealed-bid second-price auction, where the attribute representing the collected bids must be
viewable only by the auctioneer; or, situations where an agent might, or might not, have the right
to see whether a second agent has the right to perform an action, or even whether the second agent
has the right to see certain attributes of the market.
Privacy of local state is provided in our framework by treating the values of all object attributes
as hidden by default. An agent can seek to obtain the value of an attribute by invoking the query
17action, but an agent must ﬁrst have the right to query an attribute if the action is to be successfully
executed:
Deﬁnition 7 (Query) Let
query(#object,#attribute)
denote the action of querying the value of attribute #attribute of object #object. When the
action is executed, the agent that invoked the action learns the queried value.
Unlike other actions in our framework, the query action does not directly aﬀect the market
being simulated; instead it informs the participating agents about the state of the market, and the
agents may then take other actions that will aﬀect the market.5
Due to the centrality of the query action, the monitoring system automatically executes the
action on behalf of all agents whenever the agents have the right to do so, and informs them of the
values of the queried attributes. An obvious exception to this rule is when an agent has the right to
query an attribute only as part of a transaction; the monitoring system will not exercise the right
to execute such a transaction, allowing the agent to choose when the transaction is to be executed.
The query action also provides a method for communication between agents. Our framework
supports the creation of objects that are instances of the special info class. These are objects that
all agents have the right to create, and whose sole purpose is to store pieces of arbitrary information.
Creating these info objects is another example of a built-in action. Each info object has a value
attribute, that the owner of the object can assign to any arbitrary value. By giving another agent
the right to query this attribute, the former agent can selectively (and secretly from the rest of the
agents) communicate information to the other agent.
3 Rights and Obligations
Central to our framework are rights and obligations. We adopt the approach that rights and
obligations are treated as any ﬁrst-class object with a set of predetermined attributes whose values
are part of the market’s state. Rights and obligations are tradable goods that can be given, taken,
exchanged, sold, and so on.
To give a taste of why this idea is very powerful, consider an audio compact disk sold in an
eBay auction, with the winner being awarded the item as per eBay’s rules. What is implicit in this
transaction is that the winner is also awarded the rights and obligations accompanying the item,
and in particular, the right to listen to the audio compact disk and the obligation not to infringe
the copyright of the producers of the music. That is, in reality the auctioneer was not simply selling
an audio compact disk, but rather a bundle of goods that include the item itself and certain rights
and obligations. We make this transfer of rights and obligations explicit within our framework.
5Although the query action does not have, as currently implemented in our framework, any physical preconditions,
one could imagine scenarios where such an extension would be useful. For example, in a market where an agent’s
location is important, one might want to restrict agents to only querying attributes of objects that are “close” to the
agents, and not be able to query objects that are “further away”, even if the agents have the right to do so. Such
extensions can be easily accommodated by redeﬁning the query action in the system’s libraries.
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Rights determine the actions that an agent can take, and can arise from ownership or possession
of items, or otherwise given to an agent. In their full generality rights are conditional, with their
provisions being applicable only under certain conditions.
Deﬁnition 8 (Rights) Let
right(#action, #condition)
denote the right to execute action #action whenever condition #condition is true. The right is
exercised by an agent that holds the right if the agent invokes the action #action.
As an example, an agent renting a car from 10:00am to 6:00pm might be given a right of the
form right(drive car, 10:00am ≤ CurrentTime ≤ 6:00pm),w h e r eCurrentTime denotes the
current time of day.6 If the condition is not met (and given that the agent does not have any other
rights on driving the car), then the agent cannot drive the car, by virtue of the restriction principle.
The syntax of conditional rights is suﬃciently expressive to account for perpetual and expiring
rights, and for more involved rights, such as the perpetual right to buy bonds, but only once every
year and within a limited time span. This last right can be expressed, for instance, as
right(buy bonds, February 1st ≤ CurrentDate ≤ March 1st & not invoked(buy bonds,
CurrentYear)),
where CurrentDate and CurrentYear denote, respectively, the current date and year.
It can be useful for an agent to waive its right to perform some action, making in this way a
commitment to other agents. In other situations, an agent’s rights may be revoked as a result of
some violation of that agent with respect to the rules of the market. For instance, an agent failing
to pay for an item won at some auction may lose its right to bid in future auctions. Modeling
such situations requires agents to have distinct instances of their rights because the destruction of
one such instance does not aﬀect the rest of the instances, which can still be exercised. Thus, an
agent may have the right to bid on all auctioned items because all agents are given such a right,
and may also have the ownership-implied right to bid on any item auctioned by the ﬁrm for which
the person represented by an agent is an employee. Losing the former right, e.g., because of failed
obligations, does not exclude the agent from exercising the latter right in those cases that it applies.
This requirement of having multiple instances of rights further motivates our treatment of rights
(and obligations) as goods, owned or possessed by agents.
Expiring rights, that is, rights that expire after their use, are also useful. For example, a movie
ticket is naturally modeled as a right to see a movie, that expires as soon as it has been exercised.
When you exercise the right to see the movie, you simultaneously execute the see movie action and
the give up(#right) action; equivalent to your ticket being torn by the person at the theater’s
door. Note that this is not simply a conditional right, whose condition deﬁnes that the see movie
action should not have been executed by the agent in order for the right to be applicable. Having
seen a movie in the past using a diﬀerent ticket should not preclude the agent from seeing it again.
Expiring rights are handled by the exercise once transaction deﬁned as follows:
6For ease of presentation, code fragments presented as part of the discussion will sometimes deviate from the
syntax of the scripting language. This is done, for instance, when presenting code fragments dealing with time and
the invocation of actions.
19action(#agent, exercise once(#right, #action)) :-
transaction([#action, give up(#right)]).
So, for example, if Bob was to buy a ticket to see a movie, he would have been given a right
#right of the form right(exercise once(#right, see(movie)), true), where both appear-
ances of #right refer to the name of the same right (which corresponds to the ticket’s serial
number). Notice that the right is for the exercise once transaction and not the see(movie)
action, and that the right refers to itself, specifying that it is to be given up once used.
3.2 Obligations
Our framework also adopts obligations, which deﬁne sanctions that an agent must face if certain
(violating) conditions are met before certain other (satisfying) conditions are met. Without directly
constraining an agent’s behavior, obligations will indirectly inﬂuence the behavior of a rational agent
that wishes to avoid sanctions. One can think about obligations as providing soft constraints on
behavior. In accordance to the free-will principle, an agent freely chooses when and how to satisfy
its obligations by appropriately exercising its rights.
Rather than enforcing that agents meet their obligations, for instance by performing planning
on an agent’s behalf, we let the monitoring system detect violations and impose sanctions, as
deﬁned by the domain designer or the participating agents. Sanctions might include the revocation
of an agent’s rights, the loss of money or possessions, the enforcement of additional obligations,
or the banning of an agent from participating in the market mechanism altogether. We will see
that it can be useful for an agent to voluntarily adopt an obligation, and (as objects) obligations
can also be transferred between agents. The domain designer is responsible for prescribing the
class of obligations, which includes the type of their sanctions, that is available to the agents, and
the conditions under which these obligations may be taken on or given. Out of the available set
of choices, the agents are free to choose how obligations are to be employed, according to their
individual goals.
Deﬁnition 9 (Obligations) Let
obligation(#satisfy, #violate, #sanction)
denote the obligation of ensuring that condition #satisfy is satisﬁed no later than condition
#violate, under penalty of invoking action #sanction.
Each obligation is associated with two constraints, corresponding, respectively, to the conditions
that satisfy or violate the obligation. Since both conditions can be satisﬁed at the same or diﬀerent
points in the evolution of the state of an economic environment, the one satisﬁed ﬁrst determines
the status of the obligation. If the two conditions of some obligation are satisﬁed at the same time,
then the obligation is considered to be satisﬁed. In the case of a violation the appropriate punitive
sanction is imposed through the invocation of action #sanction. This general form allows us to
represent obligations of the following forms:
obligation(false, account balance(alice) < 1000, close account(alice)),
obligation(account balance(alice) > 1000, CurrentYear > 2009,
charge account(alice, 100)).
20Assuming that Alice holds such obligations, then in the ﬁrst case she must ensure that her
bank balance does not drop below US $1000 at any time, under penalty of her bank account being
closed. In the second case she must ensure that her bank balance goes above US $1000 (but not
necessarily stays there) at some time before the end of the year 2009, under penalty of US $100
being deducted from her account.
Agents retain possession of obligations after these expire (violated, or satisﬁed). This provides
an agent with a way to prove that it, or someone else, met or violated an obligation, by allowing
other agents to see the status of such obligations through providing appropriate query rights.
One question that naturally arises is what happens in the case that the preconditions of the
#sanction action are not met at the time an agent violates an obligation. As we mentioned, a vio-
lated obligation results in the invocation of the #sanction action, but not necessarily its execution.
We leave to the domain designer and agents that impose and adopt obligations to carefully deﬁne
meaningful sanctions. As an aid, one can utilize conditional actions, and thus in eﬀect contingency
plans, with a sanction deﬁned to penalize the violator in a way that makes sense given the current
state of the market. Such a sanction, for instance, could be the charge or close account(alice,
100) action, whose eﬀects are either to deduct US $100 from Alice’s account if the account has at
least US $100, or otherwise to close Alice’s account.
Sanctions should generally correspond to actions that are undesirable. What is undesirable is,
however, highly domain-dependent. Losing ownership of an object or a right might seem to be
undesirable but is not always so, since the loss might imply that certain obligations of an agent
associated with that object or right are also retracted or satisﬁed. Consider a company in possession
of nuclear waste. A country’s laws may impose on every entity the obligation to safely dispose of
any nuclear waste they posses. It is evident, then, that losing possession of the nuclear waste,
perhaps as an eﬀect of some sanction, is in fact beneﬁcial for the company, since the obligation
of proper disposal no longer applies. No universal solution exists as to what constitutes a good
sanction for a given domain and part of the burden lies with the domain designer to appropriately
deﬁne classes of suitable sanctions.
The basic axioms implemented by our framework grant an agent the right to volunteer to take
on only certain types of obligations. These are obligations associated with a sanction that is clearly
undesirable, namely that of being banned from the market altogether. Depending on the domain
description, however, an agent may be granted rights to take on additional types of obligations,
and this can provide an opportunity to choose a sanction in a way that it will not be executable
when the obligation is violated. This also happens in real markets, as in the case where a company
issues a warranty that contains many clauses that eﬀectively prevent the warranty from applying.
Other agents are free to judge the weight of the obligation and determine the eﬀective constraints
that it implies on the agent’s behavior.
3.3 Discussion: A Classiﬁcation of Obligations in Markets
Before continuing, we ﬁnd it informative to classify obligations within markets in a hierarchy, based
on the power of the obligations. Each level of the hierarchy also naturally corresponds with some
level of centralization in the market environment. Roughly, the more powerful the obligation, the
more centralization is required to ensure that obligations are met. We consider a hierarchy with
four levels and discuss whether each level can be implemented within our framework. The eBay
electronic marketplace is adopted as a running example:
21Level one: Hard obligations. A hard obligation cannot be violated by an agent and constrains
the actions of the agent, forcing it to take speciﬁc actions in order to meet an obligation
whenever possible. Such hard obligations can only exist when agent actions can be dictated
by some centralized entity. We choose not to adopt hard obligations within our framework
because they oppose the free-will principle. More than this conceptual disagreement, hard
obligations would also require that the monitoring system solve a computationally hard plan-
ning problem, to determine hard constraints on the sequences of actions available to each
agent. Hard obligations are generally absent from traditional economic environments, al-
though one can argue that the eBay proxy agents provide an example; they act to bid for a
good up to some limit while a participant is not winning.
Level two: Soft obligations. A soft obligation is a logical condition associated with punitive
sanctions. Such obligations are common in real world markets and legal systems, such as the
obligation not to speed associated with the punitive sanction of paying a ﬁne. A centralized
entity such as the judicial system of a country monitors for failed obligations and enforces
appropriate sanctions. Such a treatment of obligations acknowledges the autonomy of market
participants. eBay, for instance, reserves the right to suspend sellers that fail to complete
transactions on sold items, but does not make a seller complete a transaction. This type of
obligation is readily represented in our framework.
Level three: Decentralized enforcement. Obligations with decentralized enforcement do not
have a direct consequence. Rather, the violation of some obligation triggers the granting
of rights to other participants to take a punitive action against the violator. Whether such
actions are actually taken is decided by each of the other participants, based on their own
beliefs and goals. In certain U.S. states, one has the government-issued right to shoot a tres-
passer.7 On eBay, a participant has an eBay-issued right to leave feedback after completing
a transaction. The execution of sanctions of this kind is distributed over the entire popula-
tion. These obligations are easily represented in our framework, as obligations in which the
associated punitive sanction is that of granting rights to other agents.
Level four: Unspeciﬁed sanctions. We can also consider obligations that do not have a speci-
ﬁed sanction. There is no centralized entity to monitor for violations, and no centralized entity
to enforce any sanctions. In these totally decentralized markets, participants can choose to
monitor each other for violations, and choose whether (and what) actions are to be taken
in response to failed obligations. The sanctions are not prescribed, and are actions that a
participant already has the right to execute. Norms in such an environment are emergent, in
that no-one speciﬁes or enforces sanctions but certain violated obligations tend to be punished
in certain ways. On eBay, buyers might prefer bidding on auctions initiated by individuals as
opposed to a large company, essentially punishing a company whose corporate policies they
ﬁnd inappropriate. Consumers choose to leave messages and reviews of hotels on electronic
bulletin boards such as tripadvisor.com. Such obligations are, of course, easily accom-
modated within our framework by leaving the sanction empty in an undertaken obligation.
The role of the system is to make public the taking on and violation of such obligations and
participants are free to choose an appropriate course of action.
7The 2005 Florida Statutes, Chapter 776, “Justiﬁable Use of Force”, http://www.leg.state.fl.us.
22To re-cap, with respect to the hierarchy of obligations considered above, our framework supports
obligations at the second level and below. Although we cannot directly handle obligations at the ﬁrst
level (since that would violate the black-box and free-will principles), we can make the sanctions
of second-level obligations severe enough via the restriction principle (e.g., ban an agent from
participating in the environment altogether) so as to get a similar eﬀect as ﬁrst-level obligations.
4 Fundamental Axioms
Our framework implements a set of axioms that make precise the concepts of ownership and pos-
session, and also provide a common, shared semantics in deﬁning economic environments, such as
the right of an agent to waive its rights or take on certain kinds of obligations.
4.1 Ownership and Possession
Property rights are a basic building block of markets [26, 55] and our framework takes a stand
on what the rules governing these rights should look like. To start with, we make an important
distinction between ownership and possession. Ownership of an object implies a bundle of rights,
including the right to use the object and the right to sell it. It also includes the right to sell to
other agents various rights to access the object. For possession, we adopt the word holding,w h i c h
we take to mean rightful possession. When one holds something, one has the ability and the right
to use the object. However, one does not have the right to sell it or to sell any rights to it.T h i s
is a common situation in the real world. For example, if Alice rents a car, she has possession of
it and the right to use it for a limited time, but she does not have the right to sell it. We make
precise the notions of ownership and possession through the following axiomatic deﬁnitions.
Axiom 1 (Axiom of Ownership) We take ownership of a good to be synonymous with own-
ing the right of setting the attributes of the good to values in any manner allowed by the domain
actions.
Our framework implements the Axiom of Ownership by issuing ownership of a right of the form
right(#action, accessible(#action, #agent))
to every agent #agent joining the virtual market, where accessible(#action, #agent) is formal-
ized by the monitoring system, and holds exactly when action #action only aﬀects attributes of
goods owned by agent #agent. Thus, the framework formalizes the axiom of ownership in a natural
manner, consistent with the treatment followed for general rights. As in the case of other rights,
by exercising a right an agent can perform certain action. In the case of the ownership right, by
exercising this right the owner of an apple can sell or give possession of the apple, since the eﬀects
of these actions are only aﬀecting the owned by and held by attributes of the apple. In the latter
case, the agent owning the apple has the right to take the apple back, since the agent still owns
the right of setting the possessor of the apple.8
Note that the right associated with the Axiom of Ownership is owned by agents. This implies
that the Axiom of Ownership applies recursively on the associated right itself with the right being
8In particular, this implies that an agent owning a right, but not holding it, can still execute an action, since
the agent can always reclaim possession of the right, execute the action, and then return the right to its previous
possessor, all within a single transaction.
23the owned object. Thus, an agent owning a car not only owns the right to drive it, but also owns
the right to sell the right to drive the car, to some other agent. Selling the right to use an object
without selling the object itself is extremely common in human markets, such as selling someone the
right to walk across a piece of land without selling the land. Our treatment of rights as ﬁrst-class
objects allows us to easily express the otherwise involved implications of such natural concepts.
Axiom 2 (Axiom of Possession) We take possession of a good to imply possession of the
right to use the good in a set of prescribed ways associated with the good.
Our framework implements the Axiom of Possession by issuing possession of a right of the form
right(#action, (object(#object), value(#object,
[(held by, #agent), (uses, #uses)]), member(#action, #uses)))
to every agent #agent joining the virtual market, where object(#object) holds exactly when
object #object exists, and member is Prolog’s membership testing predicate. The way in which
an object may be rightfully used as a consequence of the object’s possession is domain-dependent,
and can be speciﬁed through the attribute uses, whose value may be determined at the time of
the object’s creation by the master agent (according to the domain designer’s speciﬁcations).
Unlike the Axiom of Ownership, the Axiom of Possession is held but not owned by agents. In
particular, the agents are not automatically granted the right to sell rights for using objects they
possess, even if they themselves possess such rights and are allowed to use those objects.
4.2 Exclusive versus Non-Exclusive Rights
Rights in real life are often not given, but rather issued. When granted the right to walk on a
piece of land, the land’s owner is still in possession of that same right, because the recipient of the
right was not given the owner’s instance of the right but was instead issued a copy of the right.
This is achieved through the use of an issuing action deﬁned by our framework, and references the
following axiom:
Axiom 3 (Axiom of Rights) We take ownership of a right #right to imply ownership of
the right to issue ownership or possession of right #right (with non-weaker conditions) to others.
Our framework implements the Axiom of Rights by issuing ownership of a right of the form
right(issue o(right(#action, (#condition, #extra condition)), #some agent),
(object(#right), value(#right, [(owned by, #agent),
(instance of, right(#action, #condition))])))
(and a corresponding one where the action issue o of issuing ownership is replaced by the action
issue p of issuing possession) to every agent #agent joining the virtual market. As a result, if agent
#agent owns the right #right to execute an action #action under certain conditions #conditions,
then agent #agent also owns the right to issue ownership (or possession) of the right to execute
action #action to some agent #some agent given that the same conditions #conditions,a n d
possibly additional conditions #extra condition,h o l d .
As an illustration of the interplay and the recursive nature of the Axiom of Ownership and
the Axiom of Rights, our framework supports the following conclusion: if an agent owns a piece of
land, then the agent may rightfully grant a second agent possession of the right to sell non-exclusive
24rights to third parties for certain uses of the land. The owner of the land need not lose any of its
original rights, and in fact may revoke the second agent’s right at any point; variations are of course
possible depending on the exact right that is granted to the second agent.
4.3 Other Important Axioms
Three additional sets of axioms are deﬁned in our framework. These are implemented in a similar
way to the ones described earlier, by issuing ownership of suitable rights to agents when they join
the market. The issued rights are presented after the brief description of each set of axioms.
Axioms of Visibility: Agents own the right to query the attributes of all objects that they own,
all held rights and obligations, and certain events that occur in a scenario (e.g., the passing of
time). These axioms guarantee that objects owned by an agent are exempt from the default
treatment of preserving secrecy of objects. The corresponding rights are as follows:
right(query(#object, #attribute), (object(#object),
value(#object, [(owned by, Agent), (#attribute, #value)]))).
right(query(#object, #attribute), (object(#object),
value(#object, [(instance of, right(#action, #condition)), (held by,
#agent), (#attribute, #value)]))).
right(query(#object, #attribute), (object(#object),
value(#object, [(instance of, obligation(#satisfy, #violate, #sanction)),
(held by, #agent), (#attribute, #value)]))).
right(query(#object, #attribute), (object(#object),
value(#object, [(instance of, event), (#attribute, #value)]))).
In each case, the right to query an attribute #attribute of an object #object is conditional
on the object’s existence, and on the object having some value #value for that attribute.
Axiom of Commitment: Agents own the right to take on obligations with a sanction of being
banned from the market. This provides a minimal means for agents to commit to a particular
behavior. The corresponding right is as follows:
right(take on(obligation(#satisfy, #violate, ban(#agent))), true).
Of course the domain designer can freely extend the set of obligations an agent can voluntarily
take on, according to the domain being modeled. An alternative form of commitment, that of
giving up rights that agents own, is also supported and follows from the Axiom of Ownership.
Axiom of Communication: Agents own the right to create info objects. The corresponding
right is as follows:
right(create info(#info), true).
25Since created objects are owned by their creator (in this case the agent itself), an agent owns
the right to query attributes of the info objects by the Axiom of Visibility, and can issue such a
right to other agents by the Axiom of Rights. This guarantees that agents may communicate
with each other within the market framework.9
A domain designer can further extend the set of axioms for the speciﬁc market being modeled
by issuing suitable rights to agents upon entry.
5 Implementation
Both the monitoring system and the speciﬁcation language have been implemented in Prolog and
the system is available at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/loizos/norms.html.
5.1 Prolog, The Standard Library, and Domain Descriptions
Prolog was chosen as an implementation language, recognizing that its goal-oriented computation
is a natural ﬁt with the computational tasks of our framework (e.g., checking if conditions are
met). The language choice is, of course, accompanied by some compromises on the speed of
execution. This concern can be alleviated by implementing computationally-intensive parts of the
code using a lower-level language like C, while still maintaining the Prolog code in those parts of
the implementation that interface with the domain descriptions.
Before a domain description is loaded by the monitoring system, the framework’s standard
library is loaded. The standard library, as any library in our framework, is simply a domain
description, and as such it deﬁnes classes, action description laws, and the interventions of the
master agent at various occasions. The action description laws implemented by the standard
library were presented in Section 2.3.6. The following set of classes are deﬁned by the standard
library, and were already discussed in previous sections:
event, info, account,
right(#action, #condition),
obligation(#satisfy, #violate, #sanction).
Regarding the interventions of the master agent, the standard library does not deﬁne the con-
stituent actions of the initialize transaction that is invoked by the master agent when initializing
the market. Instead, it is left to the domain designer to specify the initial state. On the other hand,
for the events involving agents joining or leaving the market, the standard library deﬁnes the set
of actions that need to be performed by the master agent in order to maintain the market in an
economically-sound state. Upon entrance of a new agent, the master agent creates a new account
object, initializes its balance to zero, and gives the account to the agent. In addition, the master
agent issues a set of rights to the agent as described in Section 4. Upon departure of an agent,
the master agent takes ownership/possession of all goods that were previously owned/held by the
agent. In particular, if the departing agent holds an object that is owned by another agent, the
latter agent retains ownership of the object, and can reclaim possession of the object from the
master agent. In an analogous scenario, if the departing agent owns an object that is held by
9This does not imply that a domain designer cannot limit what information can be communicated in a speciﬁc
scenario. Limitations on communication can be captured by imposing obligations on agents not to communicate in
prescribed ways.
26another agent, the latter agent retains possession of the object. Had these actions not been taken
by the master agent, the market would have reached a state where entering agents would not have
had their fundamental rights, or where objects would have been owned/held by agents that would
have no longer been part of the market; an economically-unsound situation.
A domain description is a Prolog program, and as such it closely follows the syntactic conventions
of Prolog. In particular, a domain description may contain the deﬁnitions of arbitrary Prolog
predicates, which may then be employed in describing the conditions of rights, obligations, actions,
or conditional eﬀects. A domain description may import other domain descriptions, or Prolog ﬁles
in general, in the form of libraries that can be utilized in the former domain description.
The ﬁrst part of a domain description deﬁnes the classes (in addition to the built-in ones)
that are to be used, in the manner already described in Section 2.3.1. Each class is assumed to be
universally quantiﬁed over all its free variables, but the quantiﬁcation is independent across classes.
The next three parts of a domain description deﬁne the behavior of the master agent when the
market is initialized, and when an agent joins or leaves the market:
initially([#action, ..., #action]),
on entrance(#agent, [#action, ..., #action]),
on departure(#agent, [#action, ..., #action]).
In all cases, #action is the name of an action, which the master agent will invoke, following
the invocation of the actions speciﬁed in the standard library for the corresponding occasions, as
discussed earlier. These additional actions may include the creation of new objects and the assigning
or taking of objects to or from agents. Each #action is assumed to be universally quantiﬁed over
all its free variables, but independently of the other actions. In the case of the last two constructs,
#agent is taken to be a universally quantiﬁed Prolog variable over the entire construct.
The last and most central part of a domain description deﬁnes the actions that are available to
agents, as already discussed in Section 2.3.3. As per the Prolog semantics, the free variables in the
head of the rules deﬁning the actions are assumed to be universally quantiﬁed over the entire action
description law. Free variables of the preconditions and eﬀects of an action description rule are
each universally quantiﬁed over their free variables, but independently of each other. In particular,
the eﬀects of an action are decoupled from the action’s executability preconditions, with the latter
determining only when, and not what eﬀects are to be produced. State-dependent eﬀects of actions
may be represented through conditional eﬀects. Within transactions, each constituent action is
universally quantiﬁed over its free variables, but independently of each other.
5.2 Communication, History Recording, and Scalability
Communication from agents joining the monitoring system is supported by assigning each agent a
private channel, through which all subsequent communication takes place. Thus, each exchanged
message is associated with a unique agent, which allows the monitoring system to retain a com-
munication transcript. Communication takes place asynchronously, while the monitoring system
employs a continuous treatment of time, with actions occurring instantaneously in the market
context. An agent connects to the registration module, e.g., via a public IP address. The reg-
istration module instructs the communication module to contact the agent, thus establishing a
new private communication channel between the monitoring system and the agent. Through this
communication channel the agent can invoke actions.
27In a typical execution of the monitoring system, an agent is sent a Prolog list containing all the
object attributes of the current state that are visible to the agent. Given the received message, the
agent reasons and chooses to invoke some action by replying with the predicate invoke(#action).
Messages regarding invoked actions are forwarded through the communication module to the sim-
ulation module. The latter handles the execution of the invoked actions, updating the state of the
market, and recording the new state in the state database. The simulation module also forwards
through the communication module a message to all agents, informing them of the new state of
the market (or the part thereof that each agent is allowed to view).
The administrator can communicate with and control the monitoring system through the ad-
ministrator module. Through that, the administrator can instruct the master agent to execute
speciﬁc actions (i.e., to intervene in the evolution of the market), or can perform system-related
actions, such as closing communication channels, or shutting down the monitoring system. The
master agent can be thought to communicate with the monitoring system in the same way as agents
do, despite being part of the monitoring system.
As the simulated market passes through diﬀerent states, the history of states is recorded in a
database. This facilitates the generation of a transcript of all activity, including the entrance and
departure of agents, the invocations of actions, and the state of the market. This transcript can
serve as a proof that the simulation engine is well-functioning, and as a validation of the correctness
of any intervening actions performed by the administrator through the master agent. It can also
act as a real-life legal contract between agents. For example, if the virtual self of Alice were to
sell something to the virtual self of Bob, the transcript could then be thought of as a binding
contract between the two to repeat the same transaction in real life. By employing a database, we
also reduce the memory overhead in our implementation while incurring only a slight reduction in
speed.
Regarding scalability, we are concerned only with execution monitoring, and not planning. For
instance, we are not concerned with determining and enforcing a sequence of actions such that an
obligation is met. Monitoring remains decidable and tractable as long as the conditions of actions,
rights, and obligations are not inherently undecidable or intractable to begin with. Of course, it
remains possible that a domain description will lead to an intractable or undecidable computation;
this is a result of the fact that the computational power of our framework encompasses the com-
putational power of Prolog. Experimental results using agents and markets we have implemented
suggest that such issues are unlikely to arise in natural market descriptions.
6 Example Representations
In this section, we illustrate our framework by providing the representations in our scripting lan-
guage of four examples: an open outcry English auction, a sealed-bid second-price auction, a com-
binatorial auction [12, 31], and an exchange following a negotiation process. The representations do
not describe the agents participating in the market; the agents can be implemented in some arbitrary
language, and their implementation is done outside our framework. Neither do the representations
deﬁne the process by which the markets clear; the exact process used is chosen and executed by the
participating agents. For instance, the winner-determination in a combinatorial auction can be per-
formed using combinatorial optimization, and the agent acting as the auctioneer is responsible for
running the appropriate combinatorial optimization algorithm. Rather, the representations deﬁne
the rules of the markets and capture the important properties for clearing the markets (such as the
28fact that the highest bid wins in a case of an auction). The full domain descriptions can be found
online, along with the entire system, at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/loizos/norms.html.
We use boldface to indicate the main language operators and underlining to indicate action
names. We substitute certain parentheses with curly brackets to enhance readability. Other than
these cosmetic enhancements, we present the domains in the Prolog implementation of the scripting
language of our framework. Certain Prolog predicates such as = and \=, indicating respectively
uniﬁability and non-uniﬁability, and ; indicating disjunction, are used throughout.
Objects and actions deﬁned in the standard library are used when necessary. The object clock
is an instance of the event class, and serves as a way to hold the time at which the current state
of the world was instantiated. The various predicates used are provided by our framework and
were already described in previous sections. The actions sell(#good,#price,#receiver) and
ban(#agent) are imported from the appropriate libraries, with the latter banning agent #agent
from the market, when executed. The action issue p(right(#action,#condition),#agent) is
the built-in action of issuing possession of a right to an agent. When the receiving agent #agent is
a Prolog variable, the monitoring system interprets the issued right as being held by everyone. We
assume, and do not explicitly represent below, the fact that agents have the right to open auctions
on items they own. We assume, unless otherwise stated, that bidders have the right to query all
the attributes of an auction and all the attributes of the items being auctioned. Such query rights
are given to the bidders at the opening of an auction. For ease of exposition, the sanctions in each
obligation are deﬁned in terms of the ban action.
6.1 Open Outcry English Auction
An open outcry English auction is an ascending-price auction for a single good. We consider an
auction with a rolling closure time, so that the auction closes only when there is no more bidding
activity. While an auction remains open any bidder can submit (“cry out”) a higher bid than the
current highest bid. This is the new winning bid price. Upon the auction closing, the good is sold
to the highest bidder at the ﬁnal bid price.10
To initialize the auction, an agent owning an item invokes the action of opening an auction. Refer
to Figure 2. This provides code for the open auction action, which is deﬁned as a transaction of the
create auction action, the taking on of two obligations by the auctioneer agent, and the issuing
of rights to the participating agents. The create auction action (not shown here) establishes the
auction parameters. The obligations commit the auctioneer to closing the auction and selling the
item to the highest bidder soon after that, while the right, given to all bidders, allows them to
place bids, conditioned on the new price being higher than the current price.
Bidders proceed to place (and possibly increment) their bid through the place bid action,
deﬁned in Figure 3. The place bid action is deﬁned as a transaction of the raise bid action, and
an action issuing a right. The raise bid action can only be executed if the agent’s bid is higher
than the current winning bid and has the eﬀect of updating the state of the auction. The issued
right enables the auctioneer to sell the item to the agent based on the bid and consistent with the
rules of the auction. At the end of the auction, the auctioneer closes the auction and invokes the
sell action, as obligated by the rules of the auction.
10Bidding the minimal bid increment above the current winning bid while losing and while the bid price is less
than an agent’s value is an ex post Nash equilibrium of the English auction [31]. This straightforward strategy is a
best response whatever the private values of other agents and as long as all agents follow a straightforward strategy.
The auction is eﬃcient, in that the item is allocated to the agent with the highest value, in this equilibrium.
29action(Agent, open auction(Auction, Item, OpeningPrice)) :-
transaction([
create auction(Auction, Item, OpeningPrice),
take on(obligation( % Take on the obligation
{ % to ensure that
value(Auction, status, closed) % the auction is closed.
}, { % Satisfy the obligation before
value(clock, happened at, Time), % the current time exceeds
value(Auction, last bid time, LastBidTime), % the time of the last placed bid
atleast(Time, LastBidTime+100) % by one hundred time units.
}, { % Violating the obligation results in
ban(Agent) % being banned from the market.
})),
take on(obligation( % Take on the obligation
{ % to ensure that
value(Auction, [ %i n t h e a u c t i o n
(status, closed), % that has closed
(highest bid, HighestBid), % w i t hag i v e nh i g h e s tb i d
(highest bidder, HighestBidder) % and a given highest bidder,
]),
HighestBidder = Agent % either no bidder placed a bid,
;( %o r
object(Event), % a selling action invoked by the
value(Event, [ % auctioneer for the auctioned item,
(instance of, event), % transferring the item to
(description, invoked(Agent, % the highest bidder and
sell(Item, HighestBid, HighestBidder),
successfully) % charging the highest bid,
) % was completed successfully.
])
)
}, { % Satisfy the obligation before
value(clock, happened at, Time), % the current time exceeds
value(Auction, [
(status, closed),
(closing time, ClosingTime) % the auction’s closing time
]),
atleast(Time, ClosingTime+100), % by one hundred time units.
}, { % Violating the obligation results in
ban(Agent) % being banned from the market.
})),
issue p(right( % Issue possession of the right
{ %o f
place bid(Auction, Bid) % placing a bid in the auction,
}, { % conditioned on
value(Auction, [ %t h e a u c t i o n
(highest bid, HighestBid),
(status, open) % being currently open
]), % and the bid exceeding by one
atleast(Bid, HighestBid+1) % monetary unit the highest bid.
}), Bidder) % Everyone can exercise the right.
]).
Figure 2: The open auction a c t i o nf o ra no p e no u t c r yE n g l i s ha u c t i o n .
30action(Agent, place bid(Auction, Bid)) :-
transaction([
raise bid(Auction, Bid),
issue p(right( % Issue possession of the right
{ %o f
sell(Item, Bid, Agent) % selling an item to the agent
}, { % conditioned on
value(Auction, [ %t h e a u c t i o n
(status, closed), % being currently closed,
(closing time, ClosingTime)
(highest bid, Bid), % the price being the highest bid,
(highest bidder, Agent) % the agent being the highest bidder
]), % and the current time not exceeding
value(clock, happened at, Time), % the auction’s closing time
atleast(ClosingTime+100, Time) % by one hundred time units.
}), Auctioneer) % Issue the right to an auctioneer.
where value(Auction, [ % The issue action is conditional
(auctioneer, Auctioneer), % on the referenced auctioneer and
(item, Item) % item being those of the auction.
])
]).
action(Agent, raise bid(Auction, Bid)) :-
preconditions([ % The action is executable only if
object(Auction), % the agent’s bid exceeds
value(Auction, highest bid, CurrentBid), % the current highest bid
atleast(Bid, CurrentBid+1) % by at least one monetary unit.
]),
eﬀects([ % The action execution results in
set(Auction, highest bid, Bid), % the agent’s bid being the highest,
set(Auction, highest bidder, Agent), % the agent being the highest bidder,
set(Auction, last bid time, Time) % and the time of last bid being set
where value(clock, happened at, Time) % to the time of action execution.
]).
Figure 3: The place bid and raise bid actions for an open outcry English auction.
31action(Agent, create auction(Auction, Item, OpeningPrice)) :-
preconditions([ % The action is executable only if
\+ object(Auction) % the auction does not already exist.
]),
eﬀects([ % The action execution results in
create(Auction, sealed auction), % a sealed-bid auction being created,
set(Auction, owned by, Agent), % being owned by the agent,
set(Auction, held by, Agent), % being held by the agent,
set(Auction, auctioneer, Agent), % with the agent as the auctioneer,
set(Auction, status, open), % the auction being currently open,
set(Auction, item, Item), % with the speciﬁed auctioned item,
set(Auction, set of bids, [(Agent,OpeningPrice)]), % an opening price set by the agent,
set(Auction, winner, undefined), % with an undeﬁned winner,
set(Auction, payment, undefined), % an undeﬁned payment,
set(Auction, closing time, undefined) % and an undeﬁned closing time,
set(Auction, last bid time, Time) % and the time of last bid being set
where value(clock, happened at, Time), % to the time of action execution.
]).
Figure 4: The create auction action in a sealed-bid second-price auction.
6.2 Sealed-Bid Second-Price Auction
In a sealed-bid second-price (Vickrey [60]) auction, each bidder makes a private bid to the auctioneer
who commits to sell the item to the highest bidder for the second-highest bid price. Truthful
bidding in the Vickrey auction is a dominant strategy equilibrium because the price faced by
a bidder is independent of its own bid.11 As in the case of the open outcry English auction, the
auction is initialized upon the open auctionaction being executed, which along with the obligations
taken on by the auctioneer agent, and the rights issued to the participating agents, includes the
create auction action (see Figure 4), which establishes the auction parameters. Refer to Figure 5.
This provides code for the open auction action. The rights issued during the opening of the auction
allow participants to selectively query information about the auction, and to place bids.
One diﬀerence in the semantics of this auction from that of the English auction is that the right
to query attributes of the auction is conditional on the queried attribute not being the set of bids
attribute. This preserves the privacy of the collected bids. The undertaken obligations ensure that
the auction will eventually close, and that the declared winner and payment will be in accordance
with the auction’s semantics. The auctioneer is also obliged to sell the item to the winner for the
speciﬁed payment. The predicates get first bidder and get second price are implemented by
the domain designer using the Prolog syntax and semantics to return the highest bidder and the
second highest bid; the implementation of these predicates is straightforward.
Refer to Figure 6. Bidders proceed to submit sealed bids, by updating the set of bids at-
tribute, but without ever seeing its actual contents. Each bidder only has a right to place one bid.
Finally, the auctioneer closes the auction by declaring a winner and a payment and invokes the
appropriate sell action.
11The Vickrey auction is eﬃcient, allocating the good to the agent with the highest value, in private value envi-
ronments. Furthermore, when the Vickrey auction is coupled with a reservation price (so that the item is not sold
when the highest bid is below some value), then it is revenue-maximizing with identically, independently distributed
values [39].
32action(Agent, open auction(Auction, Item, OpeningPrice)) :-
transaction([
create auction(Auction, Item, OpeningPrice),
take on(obligation( % Take on the obligation to
{ % ensure that
value(Auction, [ %t h e a u c t i o n
(status, closed), %i s c l o s e d ,
(set of bids, SetOfBids), % and that given the placed bids,
(winner, HighestBidder), % the determined winner
(payment, SecondHighestBid) % and corresponding payment
]), % are respectively
get first bidder(SetOfBids, HighestBidder) % the highest bidder
get second price(SetOfBids, SecondHighestBid), % and the second highest bid.
}, { % Satisfy the obligation before
value(clock, happened at, Time), % the current time exceeds
value(Auction, last bid time, LastBidTime), % the time of the last placed bid
atleast(Time, LastBidTime+100) % by one hundred time units.
}, { % Violating the obligation results in
ban(Agent) % being banned from the market.
})),
take on(obligation( % Take on the obligation to
{ % ensure that
value(Auction, [ %i n t h e a u c t i o n
(status, closed), % that has closed
(winner, HighestBidder), % w i t hag i v e nw i n n e r
(payment, SecondHighestBid) % and a given payment,
]),
HighestBidder = Agent % either no bidder placed a bid,
;( %o r
object(Event), % a selling action invoked by the
value(Event, [ % auctioneer for the auctioned item,
(instance of, event), % transferring the item to
(description, invoked(Agent, % the highest bidder and
sell(Item, SecondHighestBid, HighestBidder),
successfully) % charging the second highest bid,
) % was completed successfully.
])
)
}, { % Satisfy the obligation before
value(clock, happened at, Time), % the current time exceeds
value(Auction, [
(status, closed),
(closing time, ClosingTime) % the auction’s closing time
]),
atleast(Time, ClosingTime+100), % by one hundred time units.
}, { % Violating the obligation results in
ban(Agent) % being banned from the market.
})),
issue p(right( % Issue possession of the right
{ %o f
query(Auction, QueriedAttribute) % querying an auction attribute
}, { % conditioned on
value(Auction, status, open), % the auction being currently open
QueriedAttribute \= set of bids % and not querying the placed bids.
}), Bidder), % Everyone can exercise the right.
issue p(right( % Issue possession of the right
{ %o f
place bid(Auction, Bid) % placing a bid in the auction,
}, { % conditioned on
value(Auction, status, open) % the auction being currently open.
}), Bidder) % Everyone can exercise the right.
]).
Figure 5: The open auction action in a sealed-bid second-price auction.
33action(Agent, place bid(Auction, Bid)) :-
transaction([
submit bid(Auction, Bid),
issue p(right( % Issue possession of the right
{ %o f
sell(Item, Bid, Agent) % selling an item to the agent
}, { % conditioned on
value(Auction, [ %t h e a u c t i o n
(status, closed), % being currently closed,
(closing time, ClosingTime), % and the auction determining
(winner, Agent), % the agent as the winner and the
(payment, Bid) % payment as the auction payment,
]), % and the current time not exceeding
value(clock, happened at, Time), % the auction’s closing time
atleast(ClosingTime+100, Time) % by one hundred time units.
}), Auctioneer) % Issue the right to an auctioneer.
where value(Auction, [ % The issue action is conditional
(auctioneer, Auctioneer), % on the referenced auctioneer and
(item, Item) % item being those of the auction.
])
]).
action(Agent, submit bid(Auction, Bid)) :-
preconditions([ % The action is executable only if
object(Auction), % the auction exists and
value(Auction, set of bids, SetOfBids), % the currently placed bids do
\+ member((Agent,AnyBid), SetOfBids) % not include a bid by the agent.
]),
eﬀects([ % The action execution results in
set(Auction, set of bids, [(Agent,Bid)|SetOfBids]) % the new bid being added
where value(Auction, set of bids, SetOfBids), % in the set of existing bids,
set(Auction, last bid time, Time) % and the time of last bid being set
where value(clock, happened at, Time) % to the time of action execution.
]).
Figure 6: The place bid and submit bid actions in a sealed-bid second-price auction.
346.3 Sealed-Bid Combinatorial Auction
Our third example is that of a sealed-bid combinatorial auction (CA). In a combinatorial auc-
tion [47], there are multiple, distinct goods to auction and each agent may have substitutes (“I
want only A or B.”) or complements (“I want only A and B.”) valuations. To keep things simple,
we consider the case of valuations that are described in an exclusive-or (XOR) bidding language [41].
Each agent can make multiple bids, with each bid specifying its maximum willingness-to-pay for
a distinct bundle of items. The XOR language semantics means that only one of these bids can
be accepted. Each agent can submit any number of such bids and it is easy to see that the XOR
language is expressive (if not necessarily concise), since an agent can specify an explicit value for
every possible bundle.
The particular CA illustrated here is a generalized Vickrey auction, which instantiates the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to the CA domain, and generalizes the sealed-bid second-
price auction described in the previous section. Each agent makes a payment equal to the marginal
externality that it imposes on the rest of the system. In the special case of a single item auction
this is exactly the second-price auction; the winner’s payment is the second-highest bid, which is
the value that would have been achieved without the presence of the winner. See Krishna [31] and
Cramton et al. [12] for details.
We include this example because it illustrates the manner with which NP-hard optimization
problems can be incorporated into our framework. The winner determination problem in CAs
with XOR bids, which is to ﬁnd a set of disjoint bids that maximize the total revenue, is NP-
hard [32, 47]. But very large instances can be solved in practice [49] and we can handle this
by allowing the auctioneer, which is implemented outside of the framework, to use state-of-the-
art algorithms (such as branch-and-bound with linear programming (LP) heuristics) to solve the
problem and provide a proof of the optimality of its solution back to the monitoring system.
The auctioneer takes on an obligation to generate a proof to establish that the allocation is
correct. The Prolog-based monitoring system can establish correctness, but is freed from the
burden of solving the winner-determination problem (which is contained to the auctioneer). Refer
to Figure 7. This illustrates a snippet of the open auction action for a sealed-bid CA. We focus
on the place where this diﬀers from the sealed-bid second-price single-item auction, providing the
obligation adopted by the auctioneer agent that relates to the correctness of the outcome of the
auction. Because the scripting language is built on top of Prolog, the guarantees can be expressed
as arbitrary Prolog predicates; our monitoring system then veriﬁes that the predicates hold in
a particular run of the market. On closing the auction, the auctioneer determines the revenue-
maximizing allocation and the VCG payments by solving a sequence of optimization problems.
First the optimal allocation Allocation is determined, and subsequently the optimal allocations
AllocationPerMarginalMarket in each of the marginal economies, in which each agent is removed
from the optimization problem in turn (see Krishna [31]). The optimality of the solution to each
of these problems is veriﬁed.
In generating a proof of correctness for the optimality of an allocation the auctioneer can adopt
one of two approaches. One approach is based on competitive equilibrium (CE) prices. Prices
are CE when the allocation has the property that: (i) every bidder maximizes its utility (value-
price) at the prices with the bundle that it is allocated; (ii) the seller maximizes its revenue with
the allocation across all feasible allocations [5]. Property (i) is easy to verify when each bidder
submits only a small number of XOR bids, by a linear scan of the bids of each bidder to check
35action(Agent, open auction(Auction, Item, OpeningPrice)) :-
transaction([
...
take on(obligation( % Take on the obligation
{ % to ensure that
value(Auction, [ % the auction is closed,
(status, closed), % and that given the placed bids,
(set of bids, SetOfBids), % the determined payments,
(payments, Payments), % actual allocation / prices,
(allocation, Allocation), % and marginal allocations / prices
(prices, Prices),
(marginal allocations, AllocationPerMarginalMarket),
(marginal prices, PricesPerMarginalMarket)
]),
AllAllocations = % the allocation is eﬃcient
[Allocation|AllocationPerMarginalMarket], % and the determined payments are
AllPrices = % the VCG payments of the market.
[Prices|PricesPerMarginalMarket],
checkOutcomeEfficiency(SetOfBids, AllAllocations, AllPrices),
checkVCGPayments(SetOfBids, AllAllocations, Payments)
}, { % Satisfy the obligation before
value(clock, happened at, Time), % the actual time exceeds
value(Auction, last bid time, LastBidTime), % the time of the last placed bid
atleast(Time, LastBidTime+100) % by one hundred time units.
}, { % Violating the obligation results in
ban(Agent) % being banned from the market.
})),
]).
Figure 7: The open auction action for a sealed-bid, generalized Vickrey (combinatorial) auction.
36that it is allocated the bundle that maximizes its utility.12 Moreover, when there are simple CE
prices, with the prices quoted on items and the price on a bundle deﬁned as the sum of the price
on the items in the bundle, then Property (ii) can be veriﬁed by simply checking that every item
with a non-zero price is allocated. This is the approach that is assumed in Figure 7, in which the
checkOutcomeEfficiencypredicate receives the sequence of allocations and prices AllPrices that
correspond to each allocation. On the other hand, when such simple prices exist then the winner
determination problem is in P because it can be solved via a LP. We provide a second, generally
applicable approach, next.
In the general, more interesting case, we suggest an algorithm-speciﬁc method to verify Property
(ii). Suppose that the auctioneer adopts a systematic, branch-and-bound [40] algorithm to ﬁnd
the optimal allocation. The proof provided to the monitoring system would consist of the state
of the ﬁnal branch-and-bound tree. Namely, the auctioneer would provide the branching decision
that was made at every internal node, the evaluation of the allocations on the leaves, the linear
programming bound for each part of the search tree that is fathomed, and a proof of this bound.13
Happily, where a proof of an LP bound is required this can be provided by simply reporting the
feasible primal and dual solution to the LP relaxation at that node. If the LP bound is correct
then the feasible primal and dual solutions will both adopt the value of this bound. Both primal
and dual solutions can be concisely described, and can be checked quickly (in time linear in the
number of items, number of bids, and number of agents) by the monitoring system.
Once the correctness of each allocation is established then the VCG payments are veriﬁed with a
call to the checkVCGPaymentspredicate. This step is trivial and proceeds by simple numerical evalu-
ation of each allocation given the bids. Both the checkOutcomeEfficiencyand checkVCGPayments
predicates are implemented in Prolog and are part of the domain description provided by the do-
main designer. The deﬁnition of these predicates, along with the entire domain description, can
be made available for inspection by interested parties so that their correct speciﬁcation may be
veriﬁed.
6.4 Exchange Following Negotiation
Unlike the auction examples that have been presented above where multiple agents participate and
compete against each other to win a (set of) good(s), we now consider an exchange, where two
agents negotiate on what goods to exchange between them. We consider a negotiation process
where the participants take turns in oﬀering some good. At any point the agent whose turn is to
make an oﬀer may choose to leave the negotiation process. After each of the participants has made
at least one oﬀer, negotiation may continue, or the agent whose turn is to make an oﬀer may choose
to accept the current exchange. At this point the exchange happens, and the process terminates.
Although a negotiation process involves only two participants, a third agent plays the role of
the coordinator, much in the same way that an auctioneer coordinates an auction. Although it
is possible for one of the two participants to act as the coordinator, it is conceptually cleaner to
have a third party play this role. We adopt this view here. The coordinator invokes the action
of opening a negotiation. Refer to Figure 8. This provides code for the open exchange action,
12Note that the winner determination problem remains NP-hard even if each bidder submits only one bundle. This
is the so-called “single minded combinatorial auction” problem [33].
13In LP-based branch and bound, one bounds the value of entire subtrees by solving the linear-programming
relaxation at a node. If this is smaller than the best, feasible allocation found so far, then no further (enumerative)
search is required below that node.
37action(Agent, open exchange(Exchange, Party1, Party2)) :-
transaction([
create exchange(Exchange, Party1, Party2),
issue p(right( % Issue possession of the right
{ %o f
make offer(Exchange, Item) % oﬀering an item in the exchange,
}, { % conditioned on
value(Exchange, [
(turn, Party), % being the party’s turn
(status, Status) % and the status of the exchange
]),
member(Status, [initial, pending]) % allowing oﬀers to be made.
}), Party) % Issue the right to
where member(Party, [Party1, Party2]) % both participating parties.
issue p(right( % Issue possession of the right
{ %o f
accept offer(Exchange) % accepting the oﬀer in the exchange,
}, { % conditioned on
value(Exchange, [
(turn, Party), % being the party’s turn
(status, pending) % and the status of the exchange
]) % allowing oﬀers to be accepted.
}), Party) % Issue the right to
where member(Party, [Party1, Party2]) % both participating parties.
issue p(right( % Issue possession of the right
{ %o f
reject offer(Exchange) % rejecting the oﬀer in the exchange,
}, { % conditioned on
value(Exchange, [
(turn, Party), % being the party’s turn
(status, Status) % and the status of the exchange
]),
member(Status, [initial, pending]) % allowing oﬀers to be rejected.
}), Party) % Issue the right to
where member(Party, [Party1, Party2]) % both participating parties.
]).
Figure 8: The open exchange action for an exchange following negotiation.
which is deﬁned as a transaction of the create exchange action, and the issuing of rights to the
participating agents. The create exchange action (not shown here) establishes the negotiation
parameters: essentially slots for information to be stored during the negotiation process. The
rights allow the participants to update their oﬀer, accept the current oﬀer, or leave the negotiation.
The participants proceed to make (and possibly update) their oﬀer through the make offer
action, deﬁned in Figure 9. The make offer action is deﬁned as a transaction of the update offer
action, and an action of taking on an obligation. The update offer action has the eﬀect of updating
the good oﬀered by the participant making an oﬀer, and making it the turn of the other agent to
make an oﬀer. The obligation commits the participant making the oﬀer to give ownership of the
good to the other participant if the oﬀer is accepted.
The action for accepting the current oﬀer simply changes the status of the exchange to indicate
the acceptance of the oﬀer, thus precluding any additional oﬀers, and initiating a time limit for
exchange of the goods. Similarly, the action for leaving an exchange simply changes the status of
38action(Agent, make offer(Exchange, Item)) :-
transaction([
update offer(Exchange, Item),
take on(obligation( % Take on the obligation to
{ % ensure that
value(Exchange, offers, Offers), % either the agent
\+ member((Agent, Item), Offers) %u p d a t e s i t s o ﬀ e r ,
;( %o r
member((OtherParty, OtherItem), Offers), % the other party
OtherParty \= Agent, % participating in the exchange
value(Item, owned by, OtherParty) % owns the item oﬀered by the agent.
)
}, { % Satisfy the obligation before
value(clock, happened at, Time), % the current time exceeds
value(Exchange, [
(status, accepted),
(closing time, ClosingTime) % the negotiation’s closing time
]),
atleast(Time, ClosingTime+100), % by one hundred time units.
}, { % Violating the obligation results in
ban(Agent) % being banned from the market.
})),
]).
Figure 9: The make offer action for an exchange following negotiation.
the exchange to indicate that the exchange is closed.
7 Conclusions
Rights and obligations, important in human economies and often enforced through legal remedies,
will be important in agent-mediated economies in providing well-deﬁned semantics and in enabling
the construction of useful economic mechanisms. We have deﬁned a formal language that allows the
speciﬁcation of economic environments and is paired with a monitoring system that allows for the
automatic checking of rights and the enforcement of sanctions based on failed obligations. Central
to our approach is the novel treatment of rights and obligations as ﬁrst-class goods.
Building on well-deﬁned design principles, which are demonstrably consistent with existing
electronic markets such as eBay, our framework facilitates the representation of complex markets,
and allows for a natural treatment of central concepts in economic markets, such as those of
ownership and possession. To the best of our knowledge this work is the ﬁrst to represent these
notions in a completely formal language, which at the same time allows the speciﬁcation of the
dynamic nature of economic markets in which these notions gain value through their utilization by
rational agents that pursue their goals. The complex and recursive rights that follow from ownership
and possession are straightforwardly represented in our framework, capitalizing on our treatment of
rights (and obligations) as goods themselves, on which their provisions can recursively apply. Our
framework also oﬀers a rich set of action constructs, allowing conditional, non-deterministic, and
even spontaneous changes in the states of markets (as a result of events exogenous to the market
participants), as well as transactions, and contingency plans.
It is our hope that in exposing the semantics of markets to automated agents, this framework
39will promote further research into the agent-based reasoning within electronic markets, for instance
by enabling simulation platforms for testing agent designs. Orthogonally, we also hope that this
work will promote further eﬀorts to formalize, in a computer-compliant manner, other notions
often encountered in economic markets, leading in turn to the automation and agent-mediation of
markets that rely today on human involvement.
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